Minimum Wages and the Wage Distribution in Estonia by Ferraro, Simona et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Minimum Wages and the Wage
Distribution in Estonia
Simona Ferraro and Jaanika Meriku¨ll and Karsten Staehr
Tallinn University of Technology, Eesti Pank, University of Tartu,
Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia Eesti Pank
2018
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/87041/
MPRA Paper No. 87041, posted 24 June 2019 06:40 UTC
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Minimum Wages and the Wage Distribution 
in Estonia* 
 
 
 
 
SIMONA FERRARO  
Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia 
 
JAANIKA MERIKÜLL 
Eesti Pank, Estonia 
University of Tartu, Estonia 
 
KARSTEN STAEHR** 
Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia 
Eesti Pank, Estonia 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: This paper studies how changes in the statutory minimum wage 
have affected the wage distribution in Estonia, a post-transition country with 
little collective bargaining and relatively large wage inequality. The analyses 
show that the minimum wage has had substantial spill-over effects on wages 
in the lower tail of the distribution; the effects are most pronounced up to the 
20th percentile and then decline markedly. The minimum wage has 
contributed to lower wage inequality and this has particularly benefitted low-
wage segments of the labour market such as women and the elderly. 
Interestingly, the importance of the minimum wage for the wage distribution 
was smaller during the global financial crisis than before or after the crisis.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper studies the effect of the minimum wage on the wage distribution 
in Estonia, a country from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) that joined the 
European Union in 2004. Estonia is a particularly interesting case for such an 
analysis since the country has relatively unequal wage and income distribu-
tions compared to those in other EU countries, in part reflecting the virtual 
absence of collective bargaining, a modest social safety net, and a flat income 
tax system.1 
 
Concerns about the distribution of incomes and wages have increased after 
the global financial crisis and the resulting economic setback in many coun-
tries. Studies on the causes and consequences of inequality have become 
best-sellers and constitute the backdrop for debates in academics and policy-
making (Piketty, 2014). International organisations have similarly entered the 
debate and have emphasised that distributional concerns should be taken into 
account when devising economic policies (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015). Wages 
and the distribution of wages have similarly become a key issue on the Euro-
pean policy agenda (Schulten, 2012).  
 
The minimum wage is an instrument that can potentially influence the wage 
distribution. Policy-makers have seen the minimum wage as a means of re-
ducing poverty and improving living standards for low-wage workers. Mini-
mum wages were first adopted in New Zealand and Australia in the 1890s 
and later in numerous other countries. In 2014, in total 21 EU Member States 
had a national minimum wage (Schulten, 2014a). Some countries have a sin-
gle national minimum wage, while others set minimum wages only at, say, 
the sectoral or occupational level.  
 
The effects of the minimum wage on the wage distribution are not only im-
portant from a distributional viewpoint but also from a macroeconomic per-
spective. This can be the case if policy-makers are concerned that an increase 
in the minimum wage will increase the average wage level and hence possi-
bly be detrimental to international competitiveness. The spill-over effects to 
wages above the minimum wage are important in this context as these higher 
wages have a larger weight in the average wage level than the wages below 
the minimum wage. 
 
A rise in the minimum wage may affect the wage distribution in various 
ways. The rise is intended to lift wages for those directly affected by the min-
imum wage, who are those that initially earn wages below the new minimum 
wage, but it may also affect the wage distribution for those with wages above 
the new minimum wage. The latter effect is called the spill-over or ripple ef-
fect. A positive spill-over effect may occur because of employers substituting 
away from the low-income workers affected by the rise in the minimum wage 
to higher-paid workers. It may also result from the minimum wage being tak-
en as a benchmark in wage setting above the minimum wage. Employers may 
                                                 
1 The Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income in Estonia is 0.35 which is 
substantially above the EU28 average of 0.31 (Eurostat: tessi190). The Gini coefficient of is 
also high in several other CEE countries as well as many post-Soviet countries.  
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also seek to maintain a given wage structure or “hierarchy” if the efforts of 
employees depend on their relative wage (Grossman, 1983, Akerlof & Yellen 
1990).  
 
It is generally challenging to determine the distributional impact of changes 
in the minimum wage because such changes typically apply to all wage earn-
ers. A number of empirical methods have been developed to address this 
identification problem of which the one by Lee (1999) is the most commonly 
used. The methodology proposed by Lee (1999) is applicable when the min-
imum wage exhibits little cross-sectional variation and it is the method used 
in most studies of spill-over effects. The underlying idea is that the effect of 
the minimum wage on the wage distribution will vary depending on the exist-
ing wage distributions in different well-defined labour markets. The effective 
minimum wage is thus the minimum wage relative to the median or another 
measure of centrality of the wage distribution in the given labour market. The 
effective minimum wage will exhibit substantial cross-sectional variation and 
hence facilitate the identification of the distributional effect of the minimum 
wage.  
 
Section 2 provides a comparative survey of studies assessing the effects of 
changes in the minimum wage on the wage distribution in high-income, tran-
sition and developing countries. The conclusion is that there is generally 
some spill-over to wages above the minimum wage, but the extent appears to 
vary across countries, likely reflecting different institutional and economic 
environments.  
 
This paper contributes to the literature in three main areas. First, the paper 
uses the method developed by Lee (1999) but adapts the identification strate-
gy by depicting labour markets not only by their time and region but also by 
an additional dimension, either the sector of activity or the occupation of the 
wage-earners. This elaboration allows applying the Lee (1999) methodology 
also to small countries where the number of regions with sufficient size is 
limited. Second, the paper is one of the first to address the distributional ef-
fects of the minimum wage in an EU member from Central and Eastern Eu-
rope. Research on the effects of the minimum wage on wage inequality in the 
region is limited, which is surprising given that many post-transition coun-
tries have very unequal wage and income distributions (Schulten, 2014b). 
Finally, data are for the period 2001-2014 and this relatively long sample 
makes it possible to investigate whether the effect of the minimum wage on 
the wage distribution changes over the business cycle, in particular between 
the pre-crisis boom before the global financial crisis, the period of crisis, and 
the period of post-crisis recovery. 
 
We estimate spill-over effects in Estonia using data for the full-time em-
ployed from the Estonian Labour Force Survey for the years 2001-2014. The 
analyses for the full sample show that there are substantial spill-over effects 
from the minimum wage to the lower percentiles of the wage distribution, but 
the spill-over effects decline markedly as the wage approaches the median 
wage. When the effects are aggregated to the macro level, the result is that an 
increase of the minimum wage of 1 euro is associated with an increase of 
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0.11 euro in the average wage of all full-time wage-earners. The spill-over at 
given percentiles of the wage distribution is larger for women than for men 
and also larger for older wage-earners than for younger ones. The analyses 
also show that the spill-over effects on the lower tail of the wage distribution 
were smaller during the global financial crisis than before or after the crisis. 
Notably, the results are very similar irrespective of whether the sector of ac-
tivity or the occupation of the wage-earners is used to construct the individual 
labour markets or cells.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the related 
literature. Section 3 provides information on the Estonian labour market and 
the minimum wage. Section 4 discusses the methodology. Section 5 presents 
the data and summary statistics. Section 6 provides the main results in the 
paper including the effect of the minimum wage for different subgroups of 
the sample. Section 7 contains some robustness analyses. Finally, Section 8 
discusses the results of the paper.  
 
 
2. Review of empirical studies 
 
The literature on the role of minimum wages and their spill-over effects fo-
cused initially on the USA and the issue of whether declines in the real value 
of the minimum wage contributed to increasing wage inequality. Spill-over 
effects have since been studied in the UK particularly but also in a number of 
emerging-market and transition economies. This allows for a comparative 
analysis of the results.  
 
Early studies generally find substantial spill-over effects from changes in the 
minimum wage in the USA. Gramlich (1976) reaches this conclusion by 
simply inspecting the wage distribution before and after changes in the min-
imum wage and Grossmann (1983) includes the minimum wage in time se-
ries wage regressions.  
 
Later studies confirm these results using increasingly complex identification 
methods. DiNardo et al. (1996) propose a semi-parametric Oaxaca-type 
methodology that decomposes differences in wage distributions over time 
into contributions stemming from changes in coefficients, changes in en-
dowments and residuals. They study the role of supply and demand shocks 
and labour market institutions and find that the decline in the real minimum 
wage was a key factor behind the higher wage inequality in the USA from 
1979 to 1988.  
 
Lee (1999) estimates the effect of the minimum wage at different percentiles 
of the wage distribution by considering the minimum wage relative to the 
median wage across different labour markets. The conclusion is that declines 
in the real minimum wage played an important role in the increase in wage 
inequality observed for the USA in the 1980s. Autor et al. (2016) update and 
augment the study by Lee (1999) by including more data and by instrument-
ing the minimum wage to account for possible reverse causality and meas-
urement errors. The result is smaller spill-over effects, especially for males, 
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suggesting that changes in the minimum wage may in part reflect other fac-
tors affecting the wage distribution.  
 
Neumark et al. (2004) regress changes in the wage income of individuals on 
changes in the time and the minimum wage along with a number of control 
variables. The effect of the minimum wage is substantial for low-income 
earners, but since the employment is adversely affected, the net effect on total 
income is negative for low-wage earners.  
 
In contrast to the results for the USA studies using UK data generally find no 
or rather small spill-over effects. Dickens & Manning (2004a) consider the 
effects of the introduction of the national minimum wage in 1999 by inspect-
ing wage distributions before and after. The conclusion is that there are virtu-
ally no spill-over effects on wage-earners who have not been directly affect-
ed.  
 
Dickens & Manning (2004b) use the methodology of Lee (1999) to estimate 
spill-over effects for wage-earners in UK care homes, a group of low wage 
earners. The result is that the effects on wages above the minimum wage are 
negligible. Stewart (2012) estimates the wage growth of individual wage-
earners in different wage brackets, identifying the effects of the UK mini-
mum wage using difference-in-differences and the size of minimum wage 
changes. There appear to be no spill-over effects.2  
 
There are very few studies from other Western European countries, in part 
because many of these countries have not applied a statutory minimum wage. 
An exception is France; Aeberhardt et al. (2015) use data from this country 
and find that increases in the minimum wage affect the wage distribution up 
to the seventh decile, a surprisingly strong effect. The paper uses a unique 
method where a Mincer type regression is augmented with the minimum 
wage and estimated using unconditional quantile regression.  
 
Minimum wages have been found to have strong equity-enhancing effects on 
the wage distribution in emerging-market countries. For Mexico, Bosch & 
Manacorda (2010) study the effect on income inequality of the minimum 
wage, which varies across municipalities, using the methodology by Lee 
(1999). They show that changes in the real minimum wage can explain a 
large part of the changes in wage inequality, especially at the bottom of wage 
distribution. Minimum wages have also had an important role in reducing 
wage inequality in Brazil (Lemos, 2009). Moreover, the wages of workers in 
the formal and informal sectors are equally affected, suggesting that the for-
mal and informal sectors are very integrated. 
 
Few studies have focussed on transition countries. Ganguli & Terrell (2006) 
study the impacts of minimum wages on the wage distribution in Ukraine for 
1996-2003, using kernel density techniques. They find that increases in the 
                                                 
2 Butcher et al. (2012) consider panel data models for the UK where wage changes at 
different percentiles are regressed on changes in the national minimum wage along with 
control variables. They find larger spill-over effects than in other studies for the UK, 
reaching the 10th percentile and in one particular specification the 25th percentile. 
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minimum wage have played an important role in lowering inequality, more 
so for women than for men. For Russia, Lukiyanova (2011) uses the method-
ology by Lee (1999) to study the effect of the threefold increase in the real 
value of the minimum wage between 2005 and 2009. The minimum wage 
can account for the bulk of the decline in the lower tail wage inequality, par-
ticularly for females. Laporšek et al. (2015) use a difference in differences 
methodology on Slovenian data and find changes in the minimum wage to 
have spill-over effects on wage earnings of up to 150 per cent of the mini-
mum wage. 
 
No studies have formally investigated the spill-over effects of the minimum 
wage in Estonia. Hinnosaar & Rõõm (2003) compare kernel estimations of 
the wage distribution in 1995 and in 2000 and conclude that the wage distri-
bution remained unaltered despite increases in the minimum wage. Masso & 
Krillo (2008) provide data on the Estonian labour market and argue that 
changes in wage inequality are mainly attributable to factors other than the 
minimum wage. 
 
 
3. The Estonian economy and labour market 
 
Estonia is a small country in Northern Europe with around 1.3 million inhab-
itants. It regained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 and em-
barked immediately on far-reaching political and economic reforms (Staehr 
2004). The reforms exhibited a strong market orientation and comparatively 
little emphasis on distributional issues.  
 
The business cycle in Estonia could be likened to a rollercoaster. A boom 
from 2001 until 2007 produced growth rates of around 5-10 per cent. The 
global financial crisis affected the country disproportionately, with GDP de-
clining by 5 per cent in 2008 and 14.3 per cent in 2009, and then increasing 
by 1.8 per cent in 2010. The period since 2011 has exhibited a recovery with 
moderate but positive growth rates. Developments in the labour market have 
evidently reflected the very strong business cycle, as unemployment declined 
during the pre-crisis boom, increased rapidly during the crisis and then de-
clined gradually during the recovery.  
 
At the beginning of our sample in 2001 the economic transition in Estonia 
was largely complete, but the country nevertheless features some particulari-
ties throughout the sample period. The country has a flat personal income tax 
with a modest tax-free deductible, implying relatively little redistribution 
through the tax system. The social welfare system is among the least gener-
ous in Europe and is in many ways comparable to the systems often associat-
ed with Anglo-Saxon countries (Põder & Kerem, 2011). Moreover, the abil-
ity to implement counter-cyclical policies is severely limited by a policy of 
annually balanced budgets and by a strictly fixed exchange rate prior to 2011 
when Estonia joined the euro area.  
 
The 1990s was a period of rapid economic and structural change but the tran-
sition was largely completed by the end of the 1990s. Worker reallocation 
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had by the early 2000s fallen to levels comparable with those in Western Eu-
ropean countries (Meriküll, 2016). The wage distribution is however very 
wide compared to the peers in Western Europe. Moreover, the wage gap that 
cannot be explained by standard controls such as education and labour mar-
ket experience is very large across the genders (Meriküll & Mõtsmees, 2014). 
Estonia has become a country with a high degree of nominal wage flexibility 
in Europe (Druant et al., 2012) and external shocks appear in large part to be 
accommodated through adjustment in wage costs (Babetskii, 2006). 
 
The market reforms introduced substantial regional differences in unem-
ployment and wage levels. Like in other Central and Eastern European coun-
tries, internal migration has been low in spite of the sizable and persistent re-
gional disparities. Paci et al. (2010) find the internal migration in the CEE 
countries to be below the OECD average and comparable to the levels of 
Southern Europe and Austria. They also find that internal migration is con-
centrated among individuals that are young, better-educated and single, while 
other individuals react little to regional inequality. Jurajda & Terrell (2009) 
posit that the internal migration of high-skilled rather than low-skilled work-
ers is likely to reflect the higher opportunity costs of not working for the 
high-skilled. Only 1-2 per cent of economically active individuals change 
their place of residence each year in Estonia (Meriküll, 2016).  
 
The job-to-job mobility rate in Estonia is also one of the lowest among 
OECD countries, as around 6-9 per cent of workers change their job within a 
year and fewer than 50 per cent of those that change their job within a year 
also change their field of activity or occupation (Meriküll, 2016; OECD, 
2010). The low mobility of workers is consistent with the finding that overall 
labour productivity growth is almost entirely the result of productivity growth 
within sectors and only to a limited extent due to sectoral reallocation of la-
bour (Kuusk et al., 2017). 
 
The main institutional reforms in Estonia during our sample period were the 
introduction of an unemployment insurance system in 2002 and a major re-
laxation in employment protection legislation in 2009. The introduction of an 
unemployment insurance system increased replacement rates for separated 
workers and led to a lengthening of the tenure of unemployment (Lauringson, 
2011). Reform of the employment legislation system also contributed to a 
reduction in job-to-job flows (Malk, 2014).  
 
The institutional framework for setting the minimum wage has remained un-
changed throughout the sample period. The system can be described as col-
lective or tripartite bargaining where minimum wages are set in negotiations 
between employers, trade unions and the government. The pre-tax minimum 
wage was increased gradually from 102 euros in 2001 to 278 euros in 2008. 
The minimum wage was kept unchanged during the global financial crisis but 
was increased to 290 euros in 2012 and then to 320 euros in 2013 and 355 
euros in 2014. If the minimum wage is changed, the new rate always comes 
into force from 1 January. 
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The Estonian minimum wage is relatively low and not binding for a very 
large share of the employed (Schulten, 2012). The share of employed earning 
the minimum wage or less has declined during the sample period and reached 
3-5 per cent in 2005-2014. This may reflect the substantial bargaining power 
that employers have in tripartite negotiations. Unions are generally perceived 
to be of little importance as union membership is low and exhibits a declining 
trend (Kallaste & Woolfson, 2009). 
 
  
4. Methodology  
 
We use the methodology by Lee (1999) to estimate the effect of the mini-
mum wage on different percentiles of the income distribution. The method 
has been used in key studies, as discussed in Section 2. There are some chal-
lenges in using the method in the case of Estonia because there is no cross-
sectoral variation in the minimum wage and, more importantly, because the 
relatively small population limits the number of geographical locations appli-
cable for the empirical analysis. We address these challenges by exploiting 
that the mobility between economic sectors (and between occupations) is rel-
atively modest in Estonia.  
 
The underlying idea in Lee (1999) is that the effect of the minimum wage 
will vary depending on the wage distribution in each individual labour mar-
ket. In labour markets where wages are typically high, few workers will be 
affected and so the minimum wage will have little impact on the wage distri-
bution. In contrast, labour markets with typically low wages will see many 
workers affected and the minimum wage will have a substantial impact on 
the wage distribution. In other words, the effective minimum wage varies 
across different labour markets and this makes it possible to identify the ef-
fect of the minimum wage even when there is little or no regional variation in 
the headline minimum wage.  
 
Lee (1999) defines each labour market or “cell” in terms of its location and 
time. To attain a sufficient number of observation points we define each cell 
using its location, time and sectoral activity, and in some robustness analyses 
the occupation instead of the sector. As discussed in detail in Section 3 there 
is relatively little mobility in the Estonian labour market, not only geograph-
ically within Estonia but also across sectors and occupations. The low level 
of mobility low us to use the sectoral or occupational distribution as an addi-
tional margin of identification when estimating the effect of the minimum 
wage.  
 
It is assumed that the latent log wage, *ijtw , the wage in the absence of a min-
imum wage, in a cell or labour market can be depicted by the cumulative dis-
tribution function )/)(( * ijtijtijtwF  , where ijt  is a centrality measure and 
ijt  is a scale or dispersion measure. Subscript i indicates the region, j the 
sector and t the time. The pth percentile of the log wage in a cell is denoted 
p
ijtw , so for instance the 10
th percentile is 
10
ijtw  and the median is 
50
ijtw . Given 
the distributional assumption, the pth percentile of the latent log wage for the 
particular cell or labour market can then be found as )(
1* pFw ijtijt
p
ijt
 .  
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If it is possible to find a centrality measure ijt  that is independent of the 
scale measure ijt , then the centrality measure and the wage distribution will 
also be independent since it is assumed that F(.) is the same across all cells. 
We follow Lee (1999) and assume that the log median wage of the observed 
distribution, 50ijtw , is a good candidate. The argument is that the minimum log 
wage, tw , is typically so low that it is unlikely that it will affect the log me-
dian wage. This independence assumption implies that the following holds 
for any given cell:  
 
  )),(cov( 1 ijttijt wpF  ),cov(
5050*
ijttijt
p
ijt wwww 0   (1) 
 
The difference between the minimum log wage and the log median wage, 
50
ijtt ww  , is the effective log minimum wage which reflects the “binding-
ness” of the minimum wage, the degree to which the minimum wage is bind-
ing in a given cell.  
 
The implication of eq. (1) is that any covariation between the effective log 
minimum wage and the difference between the observed pth percentile of the 
log wage and the log median wage must stem from the minimum wage af-
fecting the observed pth percentile or, alternatively, from some other factors 
that may be captured by control variables. The reason is that the covariance 
between the latent distribution and minimum wages is zero given the assump-
tions so that any non-zero covariance is related to the minimum wage or 
some control variable. The exact functional form of the relationship is of 
course unknown, but Lee (1999) suggests that the following empirical speci-
fication provides sufficient flexibility:  
 
ijtijttijttijt
p
ijt wwwwww  controls)()(
250
2
50
1
50    (2) 
 
The terms β1 and β2 are the coefficients to be estimated and εit is a conven-
tional error term. The control variables may include cell specific features, in-
cluding the business cycle stance. The non-linear specification implies that 
the marginal effect of the effective minimum wage may depend on the level 
of the effective minimum wage.  
 
Eq. (2) can be estimated for any percentile p, but given the assumption that 
the minimum wage has no effect on the median wage, the marginal effects 
for p > 50 must also be negligible. This provides a test of the assumption that 
the median wage is a centrality measure that is not affected by the minimum 
wage. We will generally compute the marginal effects for percentiles above 
the median and examine whether the effects are insignificant in statistical and 
economic terms.  
 
Given the assumptions of the model and the way we estimate eq. (2) it is pos-
sible to pinpoint how the effect of the minimum wage on the wage distribu-
tion is identified. As discussed, there is no cross-sectional variation in the 
headline minimum wage in Estonia, so that type of variation does not con-
tribute to the identification. Moreover, we always include year fixed effects 
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(FE) in eq. (2) and this implies that the rest of the changes in wage distribu-
tion from year to year that are not related to minimum wages will be ab-
sorbed by the year fixed effects. The upshot is that the effect of the minimum 
wage is identified from the variation in the effective minimum wage across 
regions and sectors and this variation stems only from different median wag-
es across the regions and sectors.  
 
Many studies relying on the methodology by Lee (1999) use data where there 
is some cross-sectional variation in the headline minimum wage, but this var-
iation may not be very important given that there is typically substantial vari-
ation in the median wage. Moreover, some studies identify the effect entirely 
from the variation in the effective minimum wage afforded by the variation in 
the wage distributions across different cells. In fact, Lee (1999) carries out 
robustness analyses with a sample of the 36 US states that do not have a 
state-specific minimum wage and where the federal minimum wage is bind-
ing, and finds the results to be qualitatively similar to those obtained using all 
50 states. Dickens & Manning (2004b) analyse the distributional effects with-
in the home care sector in the UK and estimate the distributional effects with-
in the negotiated common minimum wage for the sector.  
 
 
5. Data  
 
We use data for 2001 to 2014 from the Estonian Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
by Statistics Estonia.3 The LFS data follow the ILO definitions for the labour 
market statuses and are used as the main source of labour market statistics 
internationally and in Estonia. The LFS is a quarterly survey with a rotating 
panel and covers 15,000 to 20,000 individual-level observations each year 
(Statistics Estonia, 2013).  
 
We consider full-time wage-earners who are Estonian residents, meaning we 
exclude those who work part-time, whose main employment status is self-
employment, or whose current residence is abroad. The net wage has been 
used, which comprises the take-home pay after income tax, pension contribu-
tions and unemployment insurance contributions. Beyond the net wages, in-
dividual data on each person’s sector of activity, occupation, gender and age 
are also used, resulting in 6,000-7,000 observations for each year.  
 
While the net wage is self-reported by respondents, the minimum wage is set 
in gross terms and it has therefore been converted into net terms using the 
statutory income tax and unemployment insurance rates. The simple Estonian 
tax system with flat taxes makes the conversion from gross to net a relatively 
straightforward exercise.4  
                                                 
3 The LFS data for 2015 and 2016 are not available in the format of earlier data due to a 
change in the way Statistics Estonia makes data available for research organisations.  
4 A minor source of measurement error arises from the Estonian pension system where some 
individuals pay contributions to a funded second pillar funds. It is not possible to identify the 
individuals that contribute to the second pillar and the second pillar contributions are 
therefore not deducted when the net minimum wage is computed from the gross minimum 
wage. However, as these contributions are very small compared to the income tax, it is 
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Figure 1 shows the ratios of the Estonian net minimum wage to the net aver-
age and median wages for full-time employees using data from the LFS.5 The 
ratios have been relatively stable except at the beginning of the pre-crisis 
boom in 2003-2005. Using LFS data, the Gini index for the wage distribution 
for full-time employees has remained relatively stable at around 0.3 over the 
years from 2001 to 2014 with only a small increase in 2011-2012 in the af-
termath of the crisis.6  
 
 
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Minimum wage to median wage
Minimum wage to average wage
 
Figure 1: Ratios of the net minimum wage to the net average wage and the 
net median wage for full-time employees in Estonia, 2001-2014 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Estonian LFS. 
 
 
The original individual-level data have been collapsed to an aggregate 
database with a year, region and sectoral dimension. As discussed in the 
methodology section, this dimension defines our individual labour market in 
this paper. The database covers 14 years, five regions at the NUTS3 level, 
and 11 sectors.7 The year × region × sector dimension has been used in the 
                                                                                                                              
unlikely that this omission will affect the findings of the paper. 
5 The ratio of the minimum wage to the mean wage is somewhat higher than the ratio 
reported in the official statistics. There are two reasons for this. First, this paper reports the 
ratio of the minimum wage to the mean wage net of taxes. The tax-free minimum makes the 
minimum wage largely exempt from taxation, which the average wage is not, and this results 
in a higher ratio than if pre-tax wages had been used. Second, the Estonian LFS is used for 
the official unemployment and employment statistics, but not for the official wage statistics. 
The average wage in the LFS is somewhat lower than in the official statistics; the official 
statistics are based on a survey of employers and the missing observations have been 
imputed unlike in the LFS. 
6 Table A.1 in Appendix A shows summary statistics for the minimum wage and the wage 
distribution for the data in the database before it is collapsed to cells using the year, region 
and sectoral dimensions. 
7 The 11 sectors are defined according to NACE 2003: 1) primary sector; 2) manufacturing 
and electricity, gas and water supply; 3) construction; 4) trade; 5) hotels and restaurants; 6) 
transport and communication; 7) financial intermediation, and real estate and business 
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baseline specification, but we also test an alternative specification where 
occupation replaces the very last dimension. The minimum number of 
observations for each cell is set at 20 observations; if the cell is based on 
fewer than 20 observations, the cell is omitted from the analysis.  
 
 
6. Estimation results  
 
6.1 Estimations on the full sample 
 
We use data from the Estonian LFS as discussed in Section 5 and let each 
labour market or cell be described by its year, region and sector. Using the 
full sample, a total of 742 cells out of the maximum 770 have 20 or more 
observations, and the distributional data from these cells are used to estimate 
eq. (2) separately for different percentages of the distribution.  
 
For each of the estimations the dependent variable is the difference between 
the log wage of the percentage and the log median wage, while the 
explanatory variables are the difference between the log minimum wage and 
the log median wage in linear and squared forms in addition to control 
variables. The log differences of the wage expressions imply that there is no 
need to deflate the wage variable. For our baseline estimation we follow Lee 
(1999) and use only time fixed effects as a control variable. We examine the 
importance of this choice by including regional fixed effects and the annual 
growth rate of regional real GDP and the regional unemployment rate as 
additional control variables in some specifications.8 We have experimented 
with various other control variables and generally find that the qualitative 
results are not very sensitive to the choice of controls.9  
 
In line with almost all other studies we estimate eq. (2) using OLS. Autor et 
al. (2016) argue that there may be measurement errors and possible 
endogeneity issues and therefore use instrumental variables estimation. We 
prefer to use OLS in our case as good instruments are rarely available, and 
invalid or weak instruments may lead to biased estimations or erroneous 
inferences.  
 
Table 1 shows the results when eq. (2) is estimated with only year fixed 
effects as control variable. The estimates of the coefficients β1 and β2 become 
smaller as the dependent variable – the difference between the pth percentile 
and the median – increases. The coefficient of determination similarly 
decreases in the percentiles increase, suggesting that the degree to which the 
                                                                                                                              
activities; 8) public administration; 9) education; 10) health; 11) other services.  
8 Regional data on GDP growth and the unemployment rate are from Statistics Estonia 
(2017, tables RAA0053 and TT50). 
9 We refrain from including control variables for region and sectoral activity, and occupation 
in some robustness analyses, partly so as to avoid having an excessive number of control 
variables. Sectors are correlated with the effective minimum wage and with the wage 
distribution and would seem like sound controls. However, these variables share features that 
cause the problem of too much control. As discussed by Angrist & Pischke (2015) variables 
such as occupation may not perform well as controls in wage equations, and the field of 
activity of the worker shares the same features. 
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minimum wage binds is disproportionately important for wages in the lower 
tail of the distribution. 
 
 
Table 1: Estimations of eq. (2) for percentiles of log wages, full sample 
 (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) 
 (minw – p50) (minw – p50)2 R2 
p5 – p50 
1.106*** 
(0.100) 
0.375*** 
(0.085) 
0.441 
p10 – p50 
1.161*** 
(0.089) 
0.516*** 
(0.079) 
0.575 
p15 – p50 
1.027*** 
(0.085) 
0.519*** 
(0.075) 
0.428 
p20 – p50 
0.819*** 
(0.076) 
0.442*** 
(0.066) 
0.316 
p25 – p50 
0.662*** 
(0.075) 
0.363*** 
(0.065) 
0.244 
p30 – p50 
0.488*** 
(0.064) 
0.282*** 
(0.056) 
0.182 
p40 – p50 
0.183*** 
(0.046) 
0.091* 
(0.039) 
0.087 
    
p60 – p50 
-0.160*** 
(0.046) 
-0.116** 
(0.036) 
0.035 
p70 – p50 
-0.178* 
(0.072) 
-0.114* 
(0.056) 
0.031 
p80 – p50 
-0.289* 
(0.082) 
-0.189** 
(0.065) 
0.036 
p90 – p50 
-0.260* 
(0.119) 
-0.178 
(0.094) 
0.036 
Note: Each row reports the results of a separate OLS regression of eq. (2) with the dependent variable 
being the difference between the percentile indicated in the first column and the median. Year fixed 
effects are included as the control variable. The number of observations is 742 in all cases. Robust 
standard errors are shown in brackets. Superscripts ***, ** and * denote that the effect is statistically 
significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. 
 
 
The model in eq. (2) is non-linear and to ease the interpretation of the results 
we compute the marginal effects at the means of the explanatory variables. 
Table 2 shows the marginal effects for models with different control 
variables. Column (2.1) shows the marginal effects for the baseline model 
with year fixed effects, for which the estimation results were presented in 
Table 1. The computed effect at the 5th percentile is 0.622, so an increase in 
the minimum wage of 1 per cent is associated with a wage increase of a bit 
more than 0.6 per cent at this percentile. The computed marginal effects are 
positive and statistically significant for wages up the 40th percentile, but the 
effects decline relatively fast and are modest for the 30th and 40th percentiles. 
The marginal effects are typically statistically or economically insignificant 
in the estimations above the 50th percentile.10 
                                                 
10 The marginal effects above the 50th percentile are typically statistically insignificant 
despite the often statistically significant coefficients in Table 1. Since the marginal effect is 
derived from the coefficients of the linear and quadratic terms, the standard error of the 
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Table 2: Marginal effects for percentiles of log wages, full sample 
 (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) 
p5 – p50  
0.622*** 
(0.027) 
0.605*** 
(0.028) 
0.605*** 
(0.028) 
p10 – p50 
0.494*** 
(0.021) 
0.478*** 
(0.024) 
0.478*** 
(0.024) 
p15 – p50 
0.356*** 
(0.020) 
0.342*** 
(0.023) 
0.342*** 
(0.024) 
p20 – p50 
0.248*** 
(0.019) 
0.240*** 
(0.021) 
0.239*** 
(0.021) 
p25 – p50 
0.192*** 
(0.017) 
0.196*** 
(0.021) 
0.196*** 
(0.021) 
p30 – p50 
0.124*** 
(0.015) 
0.130*** 
(0.017) 
0.130*** 
(0.017) 
p40 – p50 
0.065*** 
(0.010) 
0.074*** 
(0.012) 
0.074*** 
(0.012) 
    
p60 – p50 
-0.010 
(0.011) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
p70 – p50 
-0.031 
(0.017) 
-0.007 
(0.019) 
-0.006 
(0.019) 
p80 – p50 
-0.045* 
(0.021) 
-0.004 
(0.024) 
-0.004 
(0.024) 
p90 – p50 
-0.031 
(0.031) 
0.040 
(0.034) 
0.040 
(0.034) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE No Yes Yes 
Growth and unempl. No No Yes 
Obs. 742 742 742 
Note: Each row reports the results of a separate OLS regression of eq. (2) with the dependent variable 
being the difference between the percentile indicated in the first column and the median. The included 
control variables are indicated in the table. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets. Superscripts 
***, ** and * denote that the effect is statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level 
respectively. 
 
 
Column (2.2) shows the effects when both year and region fixed effects are 
included as a control variable and Column (2.3) shows the effects when the 
control variables also include regional GDP growth and unemployment. The 
results are virtually indistinguishable from those for the baseline model in 
Column (2.1) with only year fixed effects.  
 
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the effects of the minimum 
wage for the baseline model. The gradual decline in the effect for increasing 
percentiles below the median wage is evident and, as expected, there is 
virtually no effect for the percentiles above the median wage. The relatively 
large spill-over effects in Estonia place the country alongside the USA, and 
many emerging markets and transition economies where similarly large 
effects have been found, but it sets the country apart from the UK and some 
continental European countries where the effects have generally been small. 
                                                                                                                              
marginal effect will also comprise the non-zero covariance of these two coefficients. 
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We return to possible factors behind these findings in the final comments in 
Section 8.  
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Figure 2: Marginal effects with confidence intervals for percentiles of log 
wages, baseline model  
 
 
The marginal effects in Table 2 and Figure 2 are elasticities depicting the 
percentage increase in the wage at various percentiles when the minimum 
wage increases by 1 per cent. It may also be useful to consider the effect in 
monetary terms, i.e. the change in the wage in euros at various percentiles for 
an increase of one euro in the minimum wage. Table 3 shows the average 
wage in 2014 for various percentiles, the marginal effects from the baseline 
model in Column (2.1) and, finally, the marginal effects in euros for the 
corresponding percentiles given an increase of one euro in the minimum 
wage. The minimum wage in 2014 was 305.08 euros net of taxes, or just 
below the 5th percentile of the wage distribution.  
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Table 3: Marginal effects in euros for percentiles of log wages, 2014, 
baseline model 
 (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) 
 Average wage Marginal effect 
Marginal effect       
in euros 
p5 – p50 319 0.605 0.631 
p10 – p50 355 0.478 0.556 
p15 – p50 398 0.342 0.446 
p20 – p50 428 0.240 0.336 
p25 – p50 460 0.196 0.296 
p30 – p50 493 0.130 0.210 
p40 – p50 550 0.074 0.134 
Note: The marginal effect in euros depicts the change in the wage in euros given an increase of one 
euro in the minimum wage. 
 
 
It is notable that the marginal effect is substantially below one euro even for 
those at the 5th percentile with wages just at or above the minimum wage. 
Moreover, although they clearly decline when the wages increase, the 
marginal effects in euros for, say, the 20th or 25th percentiles are not 
negligible. These relatively large marginal effects prove that the spill-over of 
the minimum wage to wages above the minimum wage is substantial, perhaps 
because the minimum wage is used as a benchmark or reference measure for 
wage setting at levels above the minimum wage.  
 
Extending Table 3 by calculating the marginal effects in euros for every fifth 
percentile of the wage distribution makes it possible to derive a proxy wage 
distribution with and without the minimum wage increase. Comparing the 
average wages based on these distributions shows that a minimum wage 
increase of one euro in 2014 is related to an increase in the average wage of 
0.11 euro. This back-of-the-envelope exercise demonstrates that although the 
rise in the minimum wage mostly affects workers in the lower part of the 
wage distribution, the effect on the average wage may also be non-negligible. 
 
 
6.2 Gender and age 
 
This subsection presents the results from estimations when the wage 
distributions of men and women are considered separately and when the 
wage distributions for different age groups are considered separately. Table 4 
shows the results.  
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Table 4: Marginal effects for percentiles of log wages; gender and age groups 
 (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) 
 Men Women Age 45 or less Age above 45 
p5 – p50 
0.548*** 
(0.048) 
0.729*** 
(0.034) 
0.542*** 
(0.038) 
0.709*** 
(0.040) 
p10 – p50 
0.387*** 
(0.045) 
0.607*** 
(0.025) 
0.408*** 
(0.034) 
0.570*** 
(0.029) 
p15 – p50 
0.272*** 
(0.041) 
0.508*** 
(0.023) 
0.298*** 
(0.027) 
0.436*** 
(0.024) 
p20 – p50 
0.190*** 
(0.037) 
0.390*** 
(0.022) 
0.233*** 
(0.024) 
0.334*** 
(0.022) 
p25 – p50 
0.133*** 
(0.032) 
0.299*** 
(0.021) 
0.173*** 
(0.021) 
0.235*** 
(0.021) 
p30 – p50 
0.108*** 
(0.026) 
0.214*** 
(0.018) 
0.128*** 
(0.019) 
0.170*** 
(0.021) 
p40 – p50 
0.068** 
(0.021) 
0.105*** 
(0.012) 
0.080*** 
(0.015) 
0.072*** 
(0.015) 
     
p60 – p50 
0.042* 
(0.018) 
-0.023 
(0.012) 
0.008 
(0.014) 
0.034* 
(0.016) 
p70 – p50 
0.062* 
(0.027) 
-0.038 
(0.018) 
-0.019 
(0.021) 
0.056** 
(0.022) 
p80 – p50 
0.036 
(0.036) 
-0.014 
(0.029) 
-0.043 
(0.028) 
0.102*** 
(0.027) 
p90 – p50 
0.093 
(0.059) 
0.000 
(0.038) 
-0.027 
(0.037) 
0.091* 
(0.038) 
Obs. 497 588 639 593 
Note: Each row reports the results of a separate OLS regression of eq. (2) with the dependent variable 
being the difference between the percentile indicated in the first column and the median. Year fixed 
effects are included as a control variable. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets. Superscripts 
***, ** and * denote that the effect is statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level 
respectively. 
 
 
Columns (4.1) and (4.2) present the estimation results of equation (2) when 
the distributions for men and women are considered separately. The results 
demonstrate that the spill-over effects from the minimum wage are larger for 
women than for men up to the 30th percentile. The economic size of the 
difference is also sizeable in the lower part of the wage distribution; the 
difference in elasticity is roughly twice as large for women from the 10th 
percentile of wage distribution for example. These results are the 
consequence of the very different wage distributions for men and women in 
Estonia. The gender wage gap is very large in Estonia (Meriküll and 
Mõtsmees, 2014).This means that a man at, for instance, the 20th percentile of 
the wage distribution for men earn much more than a woman at the 20th 
percentile of the distribution for women.  
 
The results demonstrate that the spill-over effects from the minimum wage 
are larger for women than for men up to the 30th percentile. The economic 
size of the difference is also sizeable in the lower part of the wage 
distribution; the difference in elasticity is roughly twice as large for women 
from the 10th percentile of wage distribution for example. The large 
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difference in elasticities corresponds to large differences in monetary returns; 
the marginal effects in euros are around 0.20 euro higher for women than for 
men between the 10th and the 25th percentiles in 2014. As expected, we find 
that an increase in the minimum wage benefits women more than men and 
contributes more to wage compression among women than among men. This 
also suggests that a rise in the minimum wage can help reduce the gender 
wage gap. 
 
The large difference in elasticities corresponds to large differences in 
monetary returns; the marginal effects in euros are around 0.20 euro higher 
for women than for men between the 10th and the 25th percentiles in 2014. 
As expected, we find that an increase in the minimum wage benefits women 
more than it benefits men and contributes more to wage compression among 
women than among men. 
 
Most studies on spill-over effects find that the wages of women are more 
affected by a rise in the minimum wage than are the wages of men.11 Women 
usually earn lower wages than men and the minimum wage is therefore much 
more binding for women. The greater spill-overs for women are therefore 
typically a reflection of different wage distributions. The results for Estonia 
are in line with those from the literature and are consistent with the fact that 
the gender wage gap in Estonia is unusually large.  
 
The wage distribution and the spill-over effects may also vary across 
different age groups. Columns (4.3) and (4.4) in Table 4 show the results 
when the sample is split along the age of the employees. The wage income 
for those under aged 45 years is higher than for those aged over 45 years. 
Given that the minimum wage is less binding for young workers, it is 
arguably not surprising that we find that the minimum wage affects the lower 
part of the wage distribution to a greater extent for older wage-earners than 
for younger ones.  
 
 
6.3 Boom, bust and recovery 
 
We examine in this subsection whether the effects of the minimum wage on 
the wage distribution differed across the different phases of the business 
cycle in Estonia as discussed in Section 3. We split the original year, region 
and sector level data between three subsamples, the boom years 2001-2007, 
the crisis years 2008-2010, and the recovery years 2011-2014. Table 5 shows 
the results when eq. (2) is estimated for the three subsamples separately. 
 
 
                                                 
11 See for instance DiNardo et al. (1996) & Lee (1999) for the USA and Ganguli & Terrell 
(2006) and Lukiyanova (2011) for transition countries. 
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Table 5: Marginal effects for percentiles of log wages; before, during and 
after the global financial crisis 
 (5.1) (5.2)  (5.3) 
 
The boom period       
2001-2007 
The crisis period 
2008-2010 
The recovery period 
2011-2014 
p5 – p50 
0.652*** 
(0.034) 
0.482*** 
(0.086) 
0.584*** 
(0.050) 
p10 – p50 
0.508*** 
(0.027) 
0.360*** 
(0.046) 
0.474*** 
(0.049) 
p15 – p50 
0.371*** 
(0.028) 
0.247*** 
(0.048) 
0.329*** 
(0.047) 
p20 – p50 
0.254*** 
(0.027) 
0.175*** 
(0.039) 
0.232*** 
(0.042) 
p25 – p50 
0.200*** 
(0.025) 
0.127** 
(0.041) 
0.202*** 
(0.040) 
p30 – p50 
0.123*** 
(0.022) 
0.010* 
(0.037) 
0.140*** 
(0.032) 
p40 – p50 
0.068*** 
(0.015) 
0.048 
(0.029) 
0.089*** 
(0.020) 
    
p60 – p50 
0.006 
(0.016) 
0.013 
(0.034) 
0.005 
(0.022) 
p70 – p50 
-0.001 
(0.025) 
-0.002 
(0.048) 
-0.012 
(0.034) 
p80 – p50 
0.002 
(0.034) 
-0.062 
(0.054) 
0.020 
(0.043) 
p90 – p50 
0.114* 
(0.046) 
-0.109 
(0.078) 
0.029 
(0.062) 
Obs. 377 156 209 
Note: Each row reports the results of a separate OLS regression of eq. (2) with the dependent variable 
being the difference between the percentile indicated in the first column and the median. Year fixed 
effects are included as a control variable. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets. Superscripts 
***, ** and * denote that the effect is statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level 
respectively. 
 
 
It follows from Table 5 that the spill-over effects are smaller and decay more 
rapidly across the lower percentiles for the crisis period 2008-2010 than for 
the boom and recovery periods, although the confidence intervals are 
relatively wide and largely overlapping. The smaller spill-over effects during 
the crisis period are consistent with the observation that nominal wages were 
declining across most of the wage distribution during the crisis years in spite 
of the headline minimum wage remaining constant. These results also apply 
if the GDP growth rate and the unemployment rate are included as additional 
control variables (not shown). The upshot is that the effects of the minimum 
wage on the wage distribution may vary across boom, crisis and recovery 
periods, in all likelihood reflecting changing wage setting behaviour across 
the business cycle.  
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7. Robustness 
 
The estimations have so far considered labour markets or cells based on the 
year, region and sector. Although there is limited mobility of labour between 
sectors in Estonia, it is nevertheless advisable to assess whether the use of the 
sector as an additional margin of identification is appropriate. We have 
therefore repeated the estimations from Table 2 replacing the sector with the 
occupation in the definition of the cells. Data suggest that mobility between 
occupations is of broadly the same range as mobility between sectors, 
although it is even slightly lower between occupations. There are nine 
occupation groups at the ISCO 1-digit level of aggregation, which covers all 
occupations from elementary workers to managers but excludes the military. 
The change results in 590 cells with 20 or more individuals out of a 
maximum of 630 possible cells.  
 
Table 6 shows the results when cells are formed from the year, region and 
occupation with different sets of control variables. When the results are 
compared with those in Table 2 it is clear that the change of identification 
margin is of very little importance. The results obtained are robust to the 
exact specification of the labour markets or cells in the aggregate dataset.  
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Table 6: Marginal effects for percentiles of log wages, occupation instead of 
sector 
 (6.1) (6.2) (6.3) 
p5 – p50 
0.565*** 
(0.019) 
0.555*** 
(0.019) 
0.555*** 
(0.019) 
p10 – p50 
0.419*** 
(0.012) 
0.416*** 
(0.013) 
0.416*** 
(0.013) 
p15 – p50 
0.319*** 
(0.011) 
0.316*** 
(0.012) 
0.316*** 
(0.012) 
p20 – p50 
0.238*** 
(0.010) 
0.238*** 
(0.011) 
0.239*** 
(0.011) 
p25 – p50 
0.169*** 
(0.009) 
0.168*** 
(0.010) 
0.168*** 
(0.010) 
p30 – p50 
0.122*** 
(0.008) 
0.123*** 
(0.009) 
0.123*** 
(0.009) 
p40 – p50 
0.057*** 
(0.006) 
0.056*** 
(0.007) 
0.056*** 
(0.007) 
    
p60 – p50 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
p70 – p50 
-0.026* 
(0.010) 
-0.022* 
(0.011) 
-0.022* 
(0.011) 
p80 – p50 
-0.032* 
(0.016) 
-0.027 
(0.016) 
-0.027 
(0.016) 
p90 – p50 
-0.055* 
(0.022) 
-0.055* 
(0.023) 
-0.056* 
(0.023) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE No Yes Yes 
Growth and unempl. No No Yes 
Obs. 590 590 590 
Note: Each row reports the results of a separate OLS regression of eq. (2) with the dependent variable 
being the difference between the percentile indicated in the first column and the median. The control 
variables are indicated in the table. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets. Superscripts ***, ** 
and * denote that the effect is statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. 
 
 
We have also implemented a number of other robustness checks. Until this 
stage cells with less than 20 observations have been dropped so that all cell 
have 20 or more individual observations. This relatively low number has 
been chosen to preserve observations in the aggregate dataset. We have 
examined the sensitivity of the results to this cut-off point and raised it to 50 
but the results did not change in qualitative terms (not reported). 
 
The monthly wage reported in the Estonian LFS is the most recent wage 
received by the individual interviewed. Temporary absence from work or 
overtime work may make the wage reported extraordinarily low or high and 
this may affect the tails of the wage distribution and also the results obtained. 
We can assess the robustness of the results to extraordinary fluctuations in 
wage income by using a question in the Estonian LFS in which the person 
interviewed is asked whether or not the wage reported is the “ordinary wage”. 
This question has been available in the LFS since 2007. We have repeated the 
estimations in Table 2 for the period 2007-2014 for the full sample with all 
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interviewed individuals and for a sample where we have excluded individuals 
whose reported wage is not the “ordinary wage”. The results for the two 
samples are virtually identical (not reported).  
 
As an final robustness check we have run estimations where the median has 
been replaced as the centrality measure by the 40th percentile and by the 60th 
percentile (not reported).12 The results are qualitatively in line with the results 
when the median is chosen as the centrality measure. In neither of the new 
specifications are there any statistically significant marginal effects above the 
new measure of centrality. This indicates that higher percentiles do not seem 
to be affected by the minimum wage, confirming the choice of the median as 
the centrality measure. 
 
 
8. Discussion   
 
This paper analyses the effect of the statutory minimum wage on the wage 
distribution of the full-time employed in Estonia using data from the Labour 
Force Survey from 2001 to 2014. The minimum wage in Estonia is uniform 
and this complicates the identification of the effect on the wage distribution. 
We use instead a modified version of the methodology developed by Lee 
(1999).13  
 
The analyses for the full sample show that there are substantial spill-over 
effects from the minimum wage to the lower percentiles of the wage 
distribution. The effects are most pronounced up to the 20th percentile and 
then decline relatively fast as the wage approaches the median wage. The 
conclusion is that the minimum wage appears to have contributed to lower 
wage inequality in Estonia.  
 
The marginal effect in monetary terms is less than the increase in the 
minimum wage at all percentiles, even at the 5th percentile of the wage 
distribution, just above the minimum wage. The estimated spill-over effects 
imply for 2014 that an increase of one euro in the minimum wage is 
associated with an increase of 0.11 euro in the average wage of all full-time 
wage-earners. 
 
The spill-over at given percentiles of the wage distribution is larger for 
women than for men. The spill-over is similarly larger for wage-earners over 
45 years than for those below 45 years. These results reflect that the wage 
distributions for men and women and for younger and older workers are very 
different. The spill-over effects at the lower tail of the wage distribution were 
                                                 
12 The requirement is that the centrality measure must be independent of the scale measure, 
and this may not be satisfied if a very high percentile of the wage within the cell is chosen as 
the centrality measure. Lee (1999) uses the median as the centrality measure and this is 
customary in the literature.  
13 The baseline results are derived using the sector of activity to construct the individual 
labour markets or cells, but the results are very similar if the occupation of the wage-earners 
is used. 
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smaller at the height of the global financial crisis in 2008-2010 than before or 
after the crisis. 
 
In a comparative context, it is clear that the overall substantial spill-over 
effects for Estonia bear clear resemblance to those found in earlier studies for 
the USA, emerging-market economies in Latin America and some Eastern 
European transition countries, but are larger than those found for the UK and 
some continental European countries. The substantial effects in Estonia may 
be tied to a number of structural features of the economy and the role played 
by the minimum wage in wage and price setting in the country.   
 
First, the absence of collective bargaining in Estonia makes the minimum 
wage the arguably most important institutional measure affecting wages and 
employment in Estonia. This is compounded by the flat income tax system 
which means that the marginal tax rate remains unchanged at higher income 
levels.  
 
Second, changes to the minimum wage are announced in advance and take 
effect from 1 January of the following year. Survey evidence on wage setting 
in Estonia shows that when wages are changed on a regular basis, it typically 
occurs in January or one of the immediately following months (Dabušinskas 
& Rõõm, 2011). Changes in the minimum wage are thus typically known 
when the wage setting takes place and the information on the minimum wage 
is thus easy to take into account.  
 
Third, a number of fees and prices are indexed to the minimum wage in 
Estonia; these include kindergarten fees, child support, and traffic fines. In 
this way changes in the minimum wage become very visible and directly 
affect the spending and wage expectations of many Estonians.  
 
Finally, the level of wages is relatively low in Estonia in comparison to many 
Western European countries. It may therefore be quite affordable to raise 
wages at levels above the minimum wage and the incentive for employers to 
resist wage increases for these groups of employees may thus be limited if 
their productivity makes wage increases feasible.  
 
This study could be extended in a number of ways. One direction would be to 
seek to validate or cross-check the results using other empirical methods, 
preferably incorporating possible effects on employment. The challenge in 
this context is to account for the lack of cross-sectional variability in the 
headline minimum wage in Estonia. Another interesting direction would be 
to produce similar analyses for other European countries with the aim of 
facilitating a direct comparison of spill-over effects across countries. We 
leave these questions for future research.  
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Appendix A 
 
Table A.1: Summary statistics, full time wage-earners 
  
Gross minimum 
wage 
Net minimum 
wage 
Median of          
net wage 
Std. dev. of        
net wage 
2001 102 92.12 192 155 
2002 118 103.09 211 166 
2003 138 117.74 224 163 
2004 159 139.62 256 177 
2005 172 155.57 288 220 
2006 192 176.39 345 262 
2007 230 206.48 447 307 
2008 278 248.54 511 356 
2009 278 246.03 511 365 
2010 278 243.71 511 384 
2011 278 243.71 510 483 
2012 290 252.93 550 425 
2013 320 277.98 600 447 
2014 355 305.08 650 450 
Note: The wages are expressed in euros per month. For 2001-2010 the wages have been 
converted from EEK to EUR using the fixed exchange rate 1 EUR = 15.6466 EEK 
Source: Own calculations using data from the LFS (2001-2014). 
 
